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• Involuntary conversions,29
• Transfers after the death of the initial seller or buyer,30
• Where it is established to the satisfaction of the
Internal Revenue Service that none of the dispositions had
as one of its principal purposes income tax avoidance,31
• Sales or exchanges of stock to the issuing
corporation.32
Recapture of depreciation
It is important to keep in mind that all depreciation
recapture on the installment sale of property is taxed in the
year of sale.33 Therefore, all installment obligations
surviving the other two rules may be ineffective in deferring
gain to the extent of recapture of depreciation.
In conclusions
For any related party transaction, careful review of all
three rules is advisable. Even if a transaction escapes the
depreciable property rule, the two-year redisposition
provision may snare the transaction. Obligations
sidestepping both of those rules may be subject to
depreciation recapture in the year of sale.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
CLAIMS. The debtor had granted a security interest in a
portion of a hay crop grown or to be grown and the proceeds
of the hay. The security interest had priority over all other
security interests in the hay. On the date of the petition,
some of the collateral hay was harvested and baled and
some remained growing. The debtor sought to limit the
security interest to the value of the hay on the date of the
petition so that the debtor could use the appreciated value
resulting from further growing and harvesting to secure new
operating loans. The secured creditor argued that the
security interest continued as to the post-petition proceeds
of the crop and that limiting the claim to the present value
would leave the creditor inadequately protected. The court
held that the secured claim continued in the post-petition
proceeds of the crop and that the debtor had to either pay
any proceeds to the creditor or escrow all proceeds for
further distribution by the court. The court did allow a
portion of the proceeds to be used to pay on a post-petition
loan authorized by the court, but the payments had to be
made from the escrowed proceeds. Matter of Ed Woods
Livestock, Inc., 172 B.R. 294 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1994).
DISCHARGE. A secured creditor sought denial of the
debtor’s discharge for several reasons: (1) the debtor had
removed several accessory items from a truck which were
part of the collateral; (2) the debtor failed to turn over tax
refunds and the proceeds from the sale of wheat which was
collateral for a loan; (3) the debtor failed to explain the loss
of assets between the time of the loan application and the
bankruptcy filing; (4) the debtor made several post-petition
payments to pre-petition creditors; (5) the debtor failed to
include a debt to the debtor’s father on the loan application;
and (6) the debtor’s father altered the terms of the loan when
the father, as employee of the creditor, entered the loan
terms on the creditor’s computer. The court denied the
creditor’s requests for denial of discharge, holding that: (1)
the removal of the accessories was not made with intent to
harm the creditor because the accessories were removed
years in advance of the repossession and the debtor believed
the accessories were not subject to the security agreement;
(2) the failure to pay the tax refunds and proceeds from the
sale of the wheat was not made with intent to harm the
creditor because the debtor was unaware that the funds were
estate property; (3) the difference in the value of assets and
liabilities between the loan application and schedule of
assets in bankruptcy did not alone demonstrate any loss of
assets; (4) the payments to pre-petition creditors were not
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made fraudulently because the debtor did not fully
understand that the payments needed to be reported; (5) the
creditor was aware of the debt to the debtor’s father; and (6)
the debtor’s discharge could not be denied based on the
misconduct of the debtor’s father. In re Parsell, 172 B.R.
236 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994).
The debtors had received a discharge in their Chapter 7
case but the IRS discovered that the debtors had not listed a
coin collection on their schedule of assets which the debtors
claimed as a gift from a parent. The gift was found to not be
bona fide because the parent had only intended the debtors
to retain the coins for safe keeping and the gift document for
the coins was forged by the debtors. The court held that the
discharge would be revoked because even though the coins
were not a gift, the misappropriation of the coins was
considered income to the debtors which they failed to report
on their bankruptcy schedules. In re Walters, 94-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,590 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1994).
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor claimed a homestead
exemption for the debtor’s residence and sought to avoid a
judicial lien on the property. Under Indiana law, Ind. Code §
34-2-28-1, a judgment lien does not attach to a debtor’s
exemption amount in a homestead. The court held that
because the judicial lien did not attach to the debtor’s
exemption, the lien did not impair the exemption and could
not be avoided. The court also held that the cloud on the title
from the lien was not sufficient impairment to warrant
avoidance of the lien. In re Zupan, 172 B.R. 250 (Bankr.
S.D. Ind. 1993).
HOMESTEAD. The debtors lost a 190 acre tract of
farmland to a creditor on a consent decree. The debtors
refused to move from the tract, claiming that the entire tract
was their homestead. At the time of the consent decree, the
debtors also owned a contiguous 40 acre parcel to which
they moved and which they claimed as an exempt
homestead in the bankruptcy case. The debtors argued that
because they had considered the entire 230 acres as their
homestead and had not declared any specific portion as a
homestead, they could make the declaration in the
bankruptcy case. The court held that the exemption would
not be effective as against the judgment creditor because the
homestead declaration occurred after the judgment lien
arose. In re Austin, 172 B.R. 262 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
1994).
The debtor’s homestead was sold during the bankruptcy
case and the debtor claimed a homestead exemption under
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 794.710 in the proceeds. The District
Court held that the exemption in the proceeds was not
available to a sale of a homestead in a bankruptcy case
because the exemption for proceeds was limited by the
statute only to sales of homesteads to enforce money
judgments. The appellate court reversed, holding that the
legislative history of the exemption supported the allowance
of the homestead exemption to bankruptcy debtors. In re
Pladson, 35 F.3d 462 (9th Cir. 1994), rev’g, 154 B.R. 305
(N.D. Cal. 1993).
HOUSEHOLD GOODS. The debtors sought to  avoid
nonpurchase money, nonpossessory security interests in two
air conditioners, a VCR and a video camera as household
goods. The court held that the video camera and one of the
air conditioners were not exempt household goods but the
the VCR was a household good. The court also held that the
other air conditioner was eligible for the household good
exemption because it was purchased on the advice of a
physician to ease the debtors’ child’s asthma condition. In
re Farson, 172 B.R. 17 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994).
LIFE INSURANCE. The debtor claimed an exemption
for the cash surrender value of two life insurance policies
owned by the debtor. The Colorado exemption, Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 13-54-102(1)(l), allows an exemption for “the avails
of policies or certificates of life insurance.” The court held
that the term “avails” includes the cash surrender value of a
life insurance policy and allowed the exemption. In re
Griese, 172 B.R. 336 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1994).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor had defaulted on a
loan secured by farm land and the secured creditor obtained
a foreclosure judgment. The debtor filed for Chapter 12 just
before the foreclosure sale was to occur and the creditor
sought relief from the automatic stay, arguing that the
debtor could not propose a confirmable plan. The creditor
argued that the foreclosure judgment replaced the mortgage
on the land and that the judgment could not be modified by
the plan. The parties stipulated that if the debtor could not
stretch out the default costs and the loan payments over the
length of a plan, the debtors could not propose a
confirmable plan. The court held that, under S. D. C.L. § 21-
47-11, the foreclosure judgment incorporated the mortgage
and became security for the creditor’s claim against the
debtor; however, the mortgage and mortgage lien were not
extinguished by a foreclosure judgment until the property is
sold. Therefore, because the debtor filed for bankruptcy
prior to the foreclosure sale, the mortgage remained viable
and could be modified by the debtor’s Chapter 12 plan.
Because the creditor was adequately protected by the lien
and the debtor’s equity in the property and the debtor could
propose a confirmable plan, the creditor was not entitled to
relief from the automatic stay. In re Bunke, 172 B.R. 63
(Bankr. D. S.D. 1994).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor filed for Chapter 13
in March 1992 and the IRS filed two claims for unpaid
taxes. The debtor’s plan was confirmed in July 1992. In
January 1993, during the debtor’s plan, the IRS issued a
notice of levy of the debtor’s wages. The debtor was able to
stop the levy by a Bankruptcy Court order and filed suit
against the IRS for violation of the automatic stay, seeking
compensation for lost wages, attorney’s fees and punitive
damages. The court held that the IRS had waived its
sovereign immunity by filing the two claims in the case and
had willfully violated the automatic stay. The court awarded
the debtor the amount of wages lost from time spent on the
action, attorney’s fees for the action and $10,000 in punitive
damages which would be paid into the bankruptcy estate.
Note: The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-394, expressly waives the governmental immunity for
money judgments against the IRS for violation of the
automatic stay and other provisions. The Act limits the
amount of attorney’s fees recoverable to $75 per hour unless
special expertise was required and prohibits awards of
punitive damages. Matter of Washington, 172 B.R. 415
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994).
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CLAIMS. The IRS filed secured and unsecured claims
for taxes in the debtor’s Chapter 13 case. The debtor’s plan
provided for payment of only a portion of the IRS claims
and treated all the claims as unsecured. The IRS objected to
the plan but the plan was confirmed by the Bankruptcy
Court subject to the IRS objections. The District Court
reversed, holding that because the IRS claims were allowed,
the plan must treat the claims as secured and unsecured as
filed by the IRS and could not reduce the claims over the
objection of the IRS. In re Stewart, 172 B.R. 14 (W.D. Va.
1994).
DISCHARGE. On October 28, 1991, the debtor filed
the income tax returns for 1985 and 1986. Thus, the IRS had
until October 28, 1994 to make assessments for those
returns. The debtor filed for Chapter 7 on February 3, 1994
and the IRS made assessments of additional taxes and
penalties in April 1994. The court held that the 1985 and
1986 additional taxes were nondischargeable because the
taxes were still assessable on the date of the petition;
however, the penalties associated with the 1985 and 1986
returns were dischargeable because the returns were due
more than three years before the petition was filed. In re
Fox, 172 B.R. 247 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1994).
MODIFICATION OF PLAN.  The debtors’ Chapter
13 schedules did not list the IRS as a creditor and the IRS
did not file a claim for the priority taxes that were owed by
the debtors. The debtors’ plan did not specifically list the
taxes but provided for full payment of priority claims. The
initial plan provided for monthly payments of $275 over 60
months. The IRS did not object to the plan, nor did the IRS
object to an amended plan which reduced the monthly
payments to $225 per month. The debtors filed a second
amended plan which reduced the monthly payments to $125
and contained a provision that tardily filed priority claims
would not be paid. The IRS objected that the provision
violated Section 1322(a)(2) which requires full payment of
all priority claims. The court held that the IRS was entitled
to pro rata payment of its priority claim from the point it
filed its claim and that the priority claims provision would
not be allowed. In the first case cited below, the debtors’
plan had sufficient time left to make full payment of the IRS
claim, even at the reduced monthly amount.  In the second
case, the plan did not have sufficient time left to make full
payment such that the IRS claim would not be paid in full
and the court noted that the IRS delay in filing a claim made
the less than full payment an equitable result.  In re Buck,
172 B.R. 271 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994); In re Friauf, 172
B.R. 273 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1994).
SETOFF. The debtor obtained a judgment in the
Federal Court of Claims against the Forest Service for cost-
overruns involving a road construction contract. The Forest
Service caused substantial delays in that litigation but
eventually conceded that the debtor was correct only when
finally forced to provide documents in the case. The
Bankruptcy Court found that the Forest Service’s conduct
was inexcusable. After the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the
Department of Justice sought a setoff of the Forest Service
case award to the debtor against the debtor’s federal tax
liability and requested the Government Accounting Office
not to pay the award. The Bankruptcy Court held and the
appellate courts affirmed that setoff of the award against the
the tax liability would not be allowed because of the
misconduct of the United States in the Forest Service case
and because the freeze on payment of the award was a
violation of the automatic stay. In re Cascade Roads, Inc.,
34 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1994).
SUBORDINATION. The IRS received timely notice of
the debtor’s bankruptcy filing and the bar date for claims
but failed to file a claim for priority taxes until eight months
after the bar date. The case had been filed in the wrong state
and the trustee and unsecured creditors had brought
litigation to remove the case to the proper state and to
recover assets for the estate. If the IRS claim was given its
full priority, the claim would completely use up the
bankruptcy estate. The court held that the IRS priority claim
would be allowed but would be subordinated to the general
unsecured claims because of the IRS delay and the expense
and effort made by the unsecured creditor in creating the
estate. In re Cole, 172 B.R. 287 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994).
CORPORATIONS
DISSOLUTION.  The debtor had formed an Iowa farm
corporation in the 1970’s to farm land in Iowa. In 1973, the
corporation sold its Iowa land and purchased land in Illinois
and registered to do business in Illinois as a farm
corporation. In 1977, the Iowa Secretary of State
involuntarily dissolved the corporation for failure to pay the
annual fee and file an annual report. The debtors did not
receive notice of the dissolution and continued to operate
the farm as a corporation. In 1981, the corporation sold
some of its land to an Illinois land trust and rented the land
from the trust. The proceeds of the sale were used to pay
operating expenses and debts. In 1982, the trustee seized the
corporation’s farm equipment and other assets to recover
damages and costs resulting from the corporation’s default
of the lease. The corporation transferred the land to the
trustee, sold all other remaining land, and ceased farming.
After the debtors filed for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy
trustee sought recovery of the corporation’s assets, arguing
that the conveyances of the land were without effect because
the corporation was dissolved at the time of the
conveyances. The court applied Iowa law effective at the
time because the corporation was created by Iowa law and
Iowa corporation dissolution law did not contravene Illinois
law. The court held that after dissolution, a corporation has
authority to sell its assets for the purpose of winding up its
affairs. Although the initial transfer of the land to the land
trust was not for the purpose of winding up the corporation's
affairs and therefore was not within the corporation's
authority, the final transfers of land were made with the
intent to terminate the corporation’s business and were
authorized by Iowa law. In re Morris, 30 F.3d 1578 (7th
Cir. 1994), aff’g, 171 B.R. 999 (S.D. Ill. 1993), aff’g, 147
B.R. 930 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1992).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
AGRICULTURAL LABOR. The plaintiff was a
marketer of fresh produce. Although the plaintiff at one time
had grown most of its own produce, the plaintiff changed to
contracts with independent producers for all of the produce
marketed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff had a labor dispute
with the collective bargaining unit which represented the
    Agricultural Law Digest                                                                                                                                                                                               189
employees in the plaintiff’s cooling facilities. The
employees filed an unfair labor practice action with the
California Agricultural Labor Relations Board. The plaintiff
sought an injunction against the action because the
employees were not agricultural workers and thus were
under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board. The court held that the employees were not
agricultural workers because the plaintiff was not a farmer
and the employees were not involved with the production or
harvesting of the crops. Therefore, the jurisdiction over the
labor conflict rested with the NLRB and not the state
ALRB. Bud Antle, Inc. v. Barbosa, 35 F.3d 1355 (9th
Cir. 1994).
ANIMAL WELFARE ACT-ALM § 9.04[1].*  The
plaintiffs raised rabbits for laboratory use. Because of
disagreements between the plaintiffs and an APHIS
inspector, the plaintiffs refused to allow several inspections.
Earlier inspections had found several violations of the
Animal Welfare Act and the later inspections were made
primarily to insure that the violations had been corrected.
An administrative law judge found that the plaintiffs’
refusals to allow inspections was a violation of the Act and
fined the plaintiffs a total of $9,250 for the various
violations of the Act found in the first inspection. On
appeal, the plaintiffs raised the issue that the warrantless
inspections violated the Fourth Amendment right against
warrantless searches. The court held that the warrantless
searches were constitutional under the exception allowed by
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) for administrative
searches of closely regulated industries. The court held that
the rabbit raising industry was closely regulated under the
Animal Welfare Act, the regulations governing the searches
provided sufficient safeguards against abuse, and the need
for unannounced searches was sufficient to allow the
searches without warrants. Lesser v. Espy, 34 F.3d 1301
(7th Cir. 1994).
FARM PROGRAMS. The ASCS and CCC have issued
interim regulations implementing the changes made by the
Agricultural Reconciliation Act of 1993 and to implement
the Options Pilot Program and the Voluntary Production
Limitation Program. 59 Fed. Reg.. 59280 (Nov. 16, 1994).
PESTICIDES-ALM § 2.04.* The plaintiff alleged
injuries from the application of an algicide to a pond and
sued the manufacturer on theories of negligence, product
defect and failure to warn. The court held that the failure to
warn cause of action was preempted by FIFRA. Eppler v.
Ciba-Geigy Corp., 860 F. Supp. 1391 (W.D. Mo. 1994).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
ANNUITIES. The taxpayers were attorneys who were
to receive fees for representing clients in a personal injury
suit. The fees were paid by purchase of annuities for the
taxpayers. Under the fee agreement neither the client nor the
taxpayers could accelerate, defer, increase or decrease the
annuity payments and the taxpayers had only the rights of
general creditors against the annuity company. The IRS
argued that the taxpayers received income in the year the
annuities were purchased, equal to the purchase price of the
annuities. The court held that annuities were not includible
in income in the year purchased because of the restrictions
on the payments and the lack of any security interest in the
payments. Childs v. Comm’r, 103 T.C. No. 36 (1994).
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* The decedent’s will included a trust which would
not be subject to GSTT because the will was executed in
1982 and the decedent was incompetent from 1983 until
death in 1988. The executor, however, was uncertain as to
whether a physician’s certificate of the decedent’s
incompetency was included with the estate tax return. The
executor obtained another certificate from the physician.
The IRS ruled that because sufficient records are available
to support the claim of incompetency, the failure to attach
the certificate to the return did not subject the trust to GSTT.
Ltr. Rul. 9444016, Aug. 2, 1994.
    GIFTS OF COMMODITY FUTURES CONTRACTS.
The taxpayer donated commodities futures contracts to a
private foundation. Because of I.R.C. § 1256, the taxpayer
could not donate the 40 percent portion of the contract
eligible for only short term capital gain or loss treatment;
therefore, the taxpayer treated only the 60 percent portion of
the contracts eligible for long term capital gain or loss
treatment as donated to the foundation. The IRS objected to
the charitable deduction for the 60 percent portion under
two theories: (1) the transfers were not eligible for the
deduction because the gifts represented only partial interests
in the contracts and (2) the marked-to-market rules of I.R.C.
§ 1256 required the taxpayers to recognize any income or
loss upon the transfer of the contracts to the foundation. The
court held that the transfers of 60 percent of the futures
contracts were not partial interests because the taxpayer
retained no interest in the transferred portion. The court held
that the imposition of the 60-40 limitations on capital gain
or loss treatment of futures contracts did not affect the
charitable deduction of transfers divided according to the
60-40 split. The court also held that the marked-to-market
rules did not apply to gift transfers. Greene v. U.S., 94-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,591 (S.D. N.Y. 1994).
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent’s 1978 will bequeathed an amount of the estate to
a marital trust equal to the “maximum allowable marital
deduction.” The decedent died in 1983 without changing the
will. In 1987, Tennessee passed a statute allowing such
bequests to qualify for the unlimited marital deduction if a
state probate court determined that to be the intention of the
decedent. The trial court held that the statute was
insufficient to qualify the bequest for the unlimited marital
deduction because the statute itself did not construe the
bequest, but allowed a court to do the construing. The
appellate court reversed, holding that the legislative intent
was broad enough to allow individual states to provide for
state court safeguards of the decedent’s intent in making the
marital bequest.  Hall v. U.S., 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,183 (6th Cir. 1994), rev’g and rem’g, 93-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,135 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
The decedent’s will left the entire residue to the
surviving spouse but the expenses of the estate would have
consumed the entire probate estate so the spouse sought the
surviving spouse’s elective share. In New Jersey, the
elective share is based on the “augmented estate” which is
the probate estate reduced by some expenses and increased
by some transfers to persons other than the surviving
spouse. The estate and spouse reached a settlement which
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included transfer to the spouse of assets which had
appreciated since the decedent’s death. The court held that
the estate’s marital deduction was limited to one-third of the
augmented estate under New Jersey law because the estate
failed to prove that the settlement did not include payment
of post-death appreciation to the surviving spouse. Est. of
Agnello, 103 T.C. No. 34 (1994).
The decedent had created a revocable inter vivos trust
funded with the decedent’s assets. The decedent, spouse and
third person served as trustees. The trust provided that upon
the death of the decedent, the trust corpus passed to the
surviving spouse in trust. The remainder of the decedent’s
property passed by law to the surviving spouse; therefore,
no court supervised probate of the estate was necessary. The
trust provided that the surviving spouse was to receive all
net income and could distribute principal to the spouse but
that the spouse could not be involved in the decision to
distribute principal. The IRS ruled that the trust was QTIP
and that the remaining trustees could make the QTIP
election as to the trust corpus. Ltr. Rul. 944026, Aug. 3,
1994.
VALUATION. In 1981, the decedent established an
irrevocable trust for the benefit of the decedent’s child and
grandchild. The trust was funded with $250,000 in cash but
the trustee invested the funds and on the date of the
decedent’s death, the trust corpus consisted of a note with a
value of $187,500. The estate elected to apply pre-August
1981 law to the trust and included the trust in the decedent’s
estate at the value at the date of death. The IRS argued that
the value of the trust was the amount of money contributed
to the trust. The court held that, where the trust had disposed
of the original corpus and substituted other property, the
trust corpus was to be valued as of the value of the date of
death. Est. of DeWitt, T.C. Memo. 1994-552.
The taxpayers established two seven-year irrevocable
trusts funded with S corporation stock. The taxpayers were
each the beneficiary of one trust, with one trust distributing
annually 20.001 percent of the fair market value of the trust
corpus upon creation and the other 19.293 percent of the
initial fair market value of the trust corpus. The trusts
provided that if the fair market value of the trusts has been
incorrectly determined, the annuity amounts were to be
adjusted accordingly. If the beneficiary died before the
termination of the trust, a fraction of the trust corpus passed
to the beneficiary’s estate equal to the fractional amount
included in the beneficiary’s estate under federal estate tax
law. If the beneficiary survived the termination of the trust,
the trust corpus passed to the beneficiary’s children. The
IRS ruled that the trust interests were qualified annuity
interests for purposes of I.R.C. § 2702.  The IRS also ruled
that because the trusts had a high probability of being
exhausted prior to termination, the value of the retained
annuity interest could be no greater than the present value of
the payments receivable until the exhaustion of the trust.
Ltr. Rul. 9444033, Aug. 5, 1994.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
C CORPORATIONS
SMALL BUSINESS STOCK. Under existing
regulations, an owner of Section 1244 stock could not claim
an ordinary loss deduction for the stock unless the owner
had filed an information statement with the tax return for the
tax year in which the loss deduction is claimed. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.1244(e)-1(b); Magee v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-
305. The IRS has issued proposed regulations revising the
regulations to remove the information filing requirement;
however, a taxpayer claiming a Section 1244 ordinary loss
will be required to maintain records sufficient to establish
that the stock qualified as Section 1244 stock. 59 Fed. Reg.
58801 (Nov. 15, 1994), amending Treas. Reg. § 1.1244(e)-
1.
COOPERATIVES-ALM § 14.03.*  In order to be
registered to do business in certain states (which did not
allow businesses with the word cooperative in their names
to do business in the state; now unconstitutional), a
corporation was formed to be the marketing agent for
agricultural products of another cooperative. Both
organizations had the same persons on the board of
directors. The corporation had no profit or loss because the
gross proceeds of all sales were returned to the cooperative
which paid the corporation for all expenses. Because of a
question of whether the corporation was subject to tax under
I.R.C. § 482, the corporation amended its bylaws to conform
with the requirements of Subchapter T cooperatives,
primarily establishing the cooperative as the sole member of
the corporation and providing for patronage dividends to the
cooperative and its members. The IRS ruled that the
corporation and cooperative would be taxed under
Subchapter T as cooperatives and that the corporation would
not be subject to reallocation of income under I.R.C. § 482.
Ltr. Rul. 9443009, July 18, 1994.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14].* The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to review an
unpublished Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that
settlement payments for back pay and liquidated damages in
an Age Discrimination in Employment Act action were
excludible from income. The Ninth Circuit (see Schmitz v.
Comm’r, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,455 (9th Cir.
1994), p. 158 supra) has agreed with the Fifth Circuit but
the Seventh Circuit has held to the contrary (see Downey v.
Comm’r, 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,441 (7th Cir.
1994), rev’g, 100 T.C. 634 (1993) p. 149 supra).
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4].*  The taxpayer
corporation made improvements to its buildings used in its
restaurant business and claimed depreciation under the
Asset Depreciation Range for building placed in service
before January 1, 1981 and ACRS for improvements to
buildings placed in service after December 31, 1980. The
taxpayer argued that the improvements were included in the
ADR Class 57.0 as improvements that were part of the
structural shell of the buildings. The court held that I.R.C. §
1250 property was not included in the ADR Class 57.0 by
statute unless the IRS explicitly includes the property in the
class. Because the IRS has not included the property in the
class, the improvements had to be depreciated using the 15-
year recovery period for real property. Walgreen Co. v.
Comm’r, 103 T.C. No. 33 (1994).
EMPLOYMENT TAXES . The IRS has issued
guidelines for taxpayers to obtain refunds for 1994 for
payment of withholding taxes for household employees who
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were paid more than $50 in a quarter and less than $1,000
per year, resulting from the changes in the “Nanny” tax. See
p. 167 supra. An article on this area by Neil Harl will be
published in the Digest in the near future. IR-94-109, Nov.
16, 1994.
INSURANCE PROCEEDS. The taxpayer became
permanently disabled after an accident and received
disability payments from the taxpayer’s employer’s insurer.
The court found that the payments were based on the
replacement of the taxpayer’s income resulting from the
disability and were not based solely on the nature of the
taxpayer’s injury. The court held that the disability
payments were includible in the taxpayer’s gross income.
Webster v. U.S., 94-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,586
(M.D. Tenn. 1994).
LEVY. The IRS has issued tables of the amount of an
individual’s income which is exempt from a notice of levy
in 1995 based upon the filing status, number of exemptions
and income period involved. The tables are also published
in IRS Pub. 1494. Notice 94-100, I.R.B. 1994-46, 12.
PENSION PLANS. The IRS has announced that the
deadline for employers to adopt regional prototype, M & P,
and volume submitter plans filed by June 30, 1994, will be
extended at least six months if the employers take steps by
December 31, 1994 showing that they intend to adopt the
plans. Employers maintaining plans with remedial
amendments periods that expire before April 1, 1995, have
an additional three months to file a determination letter
application if the amendments are adopted by the end of the
three months. Ann. 94-136, I.R.B. 1994-49.
SOCIAL SECURITY TAX-A L M § 4.06.*
CORRECTION: The item on p. 175 supra should have
read as follows. Beginning with the January 3, 1995
payment, the monthly social security benefit payments will
increase 2.8 percent.  The maximum amount of annual
wages subject to Old Age Survivors and Disability
Insurance for 1995 is $61,200, with all wages and self-
employment income subject to the medicare portion of the
tax.  The maximum amount of annual earnings before
reduction of benefits is $11,280 for persons aged 65 through
69 and $8,160 for persons under age 65. The amount of
wages necessary for one quarter of coverage is $630.  59
Fed. Reg. 54464 (Oct 31, 1994).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
COMBINE.  The plaintiff was injured while cleaning
residue out of a combine's unloading auger.  The plaintiff
brought a products liability action against the combine
manufacturer under strict liability, including inadequacy of
warnings and defective design. The defendant had placed
warning decals over the auger opening on existing combines
after several accidents had occurred. The plaintiff alleged
that the warning decal placed above the auger opening made
the combine defective in that the warning was inadequate.
The jury found the combine manufacturer 60 percent at fault
and awarded $650,000 in actual damages and $50 million in
punitive damages.  The trial court reduced the punitive
damages to approximately 1 percent of the defendant's net
worth, $28 million.  The trial court otherwise denied the
defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, holding that sufficient evidence was presented to
create jury questions as to liability and damages. The
appellate court reversed and remanded the case for a new
trial. The appellate court held that the use of evidence of
other similar accidents in determining punitive damages was
reversible error although the evidence could be used for
demonstrating defect, causation and foreseeability of misuse
of the product. The appellate court also held that evidence of
other post-accident conduct by the defendant was not
relevant on the issue of punitive damages which must be
based only on pre-accident conduct of the defendant. The
appellate court held that the award of punitive damages was
not supported by the remaining evidence because the only
pre-accident evidence was that the defendant delayed
application of the warning decal on the auger opening so as
to save money. The appellate court held that this conduct
was not willful or wanton conduct in disregard of the rights
and safety of others.  The United States Supreme Court has
denied certiorari for the case.  Burke v. Deere & Co., 114
S.Ct. 1063 (1994), den’g cert., 6 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1993),
rev’g and rem’g, .780 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D. Iowa 1991).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PRIORITY. The debtors operated a hog feeding
operation and had granted a security interest in the hogs to a
bank. The debtors purchased feed from the plaintiff feed
store on credit and the feed store guaranteed the sales to the
feed producer. The feed bills were paid from the sales of the
hogs until the debtors had financial difficulties. The feed
producer had talked to a bank officer who stated that the
feed bills would continue to be paid from the hog sales.
However, a check for one feed bill was not honored by the
bank after the bank setoff the account against the debtors’
loans and the debtors transferred the hogs to the bank in
satisfaction of the loans and filed for bankruptcy. The
plaintiff sought a portion of the proceeds of some final hog
sales on the basis of (1) waiver of security interest by course
of dealing, (2) tortious interference with contract, (3)
fraudulent conveyance, and (4) breach of contract. The court
held (1) any waiver of the security interest by allowing the
hogs to be sold without prior consent was not effective as
against the plaintiff because the hogs were not sold to the
plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff failed to show that the bank’s
action were with intent to destroy the plaintiff’s business;
(3) even if the transfer of the hogs violated Iowa Code §
681.1 as an improper assignment for the benefit of creditors,
the plaintiff did not seek any remedy under that law; and (4)
the bank officer’s assurance of payment to the feed producer
did not create a contract enforceable by the plaintiff. Wilkin
Elevator v. Bennett State Bank, 522 N.W.2d 57 (Iowa
1994).
TRADE SECRETS
MISAPPROPRIATION. The plaintiff filed suit against
the defendant for misappropriation of the genetic makeup of
an inbred corn seed developed by the plaintiff. The
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defendant claimed that the defendant's seed was developed
independently from a public domain seed, but the scientific
test evidence presented failed to support the defendant’s
claim, although it did not conclusively disprove it. The
defendant’s claims were also weakened because the
defendant had disposed of the parent seed used and had not
kept complete records of the breeding process used to
produce the defendant’s seed which contained the genetic
makeup of the plaintiff’s seed. The defendant argued that
the plaintiff failed to protect the secrecy of the seed because
some of the inbred male seed escaped into the general
public seed and the seed was sold to the Soviet Union
which allowed the seed to pass to other East European
countries. The court held that the plaintiff’s controls on
secrecy were sufficient and reasonable and that the secrecy
was maintained because the inbred male seeds were
difficult to distinguish from other seed. The defendant also
argued that the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant
acquired the protected genetic material improperly from the
plaintiff’s seed. The evidence demonstrated that the
defendant had an active program to acquire the genetic
secrets of the plaintiff’s seed and that the seed involved was
derived from the plaintiff’s seed. The court held that,
although the plaintiff’s evidence was not conclusive as to
how the defendant acquired the trade secret, the evidence
was sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the defendant
to show that the trade secret was not improperly acquired.
The court also held that the defendant’s failure to label the
seed as containing the plaintiff’s genetic material was a
violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Finally,
the court held that the state law trade infringement action
was not preempted by the federal Plant Varieties Protection
Act. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. v. Holden Foundation
Seeds, 35 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1994).
CITATION UPDATES
Pettibone Corp. v. U.S., 34 F.3d 536 (7th Cir. 1994)
(offset of tax claim in bankruptcy) see p. 162 supra.
Est. of Ridenour v. Comm’r, 36 F.3d 323 (4th Cir.
1994), aff’g,  T.C. Memo. 1993-41 (transfers within three
years of death) see p. 165 supra.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $35
each in 1995.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$5.75 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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